Francesco Rigoli, City St George's University of London
Introduction
The capability approach, pioneered by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, offers an intriguing perspective for anyone interested in Aristotelian political philosophy. It has several important merits, most notably its criticism of the widespread tendency to assess a country's prosperity primarily in terms of national income or economic growth. Instead, the capability approach advocates a multidimensional conception of human development, encompassing factors such as life expectancy, health, education, personal relationships, and opportunities for meaningful participation in society. From this perspective, a society cannot be considered successful merely because it produces substantial wealth: what ultimately matters is the range of opportunities available to its citizens across different domains of life.
This represents a significant advance over narrowly economic conceptions of social progress, reflected, for example, in the Human Development Index. It also resonates, to some extent, with fundamental Aristotelian insights. Nevertheless, the capability approach has several important limitations. In particular, I will argue that its commitment to liberal individualism prevents it from developing a convincing account of human flourishing comparable to that advanced by the Aristotelian tradition.
From Aristotle to Rawls
In her 1990 essay Aristotelian Social Democracy, Nussbaum drew upon Aristotle's conception of human nature, according to which human beings possess certain capacities that characterise them as the particular kind of creatures they are. On this basis, Nussbaum argued that the state should ensure that its citizens develop these fundamental human capabilities.
Nussbaum's reliance on Aristotelian ethics, however, remains ambiguous in this essay, insofar as it is constrained by a fundamentally liberal framework. For Aristotle, human flourishing can be defined objectively, at least in broad terms, and the state has a responsibility to encourage people to flourish. It remains unclear whether, in Aristotelian Social Democracy, Nussbaum embraces the Aristotelian idea that human flourishing can be defined objectively or, instead, regards its meaning as ultimately dependent on subjective judgement and therefore arbitrary. What is clear is that, in her account, the task of the state is not to promote human flourishing as such, but rather to ensure that citizens possess the capabilities necessary to choose among different ways of life. In other words, the state should ensure that individuals possess certain capabilities without necessarily encouraging them to exercise those capabilities. In accordance with liberal principles, it is up to citizens to decide whether and how to use the capabilities they have acquired. This position stands in tension with Aristotle's view that what matters is not merely the possession of capacities enabling arbitrary individual choices, but the appropriate actualisation of those capacities. From an Aristotelian perspective, the state should not merely ensure that individuals acquire the relevant capacities, as Nussbaum argues, but should also encourage them to exercise these capacities well.
While the tension between Aristotelian ethics and liberal principles remains unresolved in Aristotelian Social Democracy, Nussbaum's subsequent works, particularly Creating Capabilities, resolve this tension more decisively in favour of liberalism. Following the Rawlsian tradition of political liberalism, Nussbaum refrains from endorsing a comprehensive conception of the good life, leaving individuals to determine for themselves how they wish to live. Capabilities are thus understood as opportunities that individuals can use to pursue their own conceptions of the good. Accordingly, the political community should refrain from prescribing particular ways of life, limiting its interventions to ensuring that everyone acquires a set of fundamental capabilities.
This position stands in tension with the Aristotelian idea that human flourishing can be defined objectively, at least in broad terms. Although Nussbaum identifies certain capabilities as useful, she leaves the question of how these should be exercised largely to individual judgement, based on each person's own idiosyncratic conception of the good. Political institutions should therefore strive to provide citizens with the capacity to choose among a wide range of ways of life, while refraining from endorsing any particular comprehensive conception of the good.
By contrast, the Aristotelian perspective holds that, through philosophical enquiry and collective practical reasoning, a political community can aspire to identify an objective conception of the good life and, on that basis, guide its members towards flourishing. For Aristotle, the mere possession of capabilities is insufficient if they are not actualised appropriately: flourishing consists not simply in possessing capacities, but in exercising them well. A person who possesses the capacity for friendship, practical reasoning or political participation, but never exercises it, cannot be said to flourish merely because those possibilities are available.
The decision to embrace liberal premises at the expense of Aristotelian ethics gives rise to several important limitations of the capability approach, which I examine below.
The problem of desire
A first difficulty concerns the relationship between individual preferences and the human good. According to the capability approach, what constitutes a good life is ultimately a matter of individual judgement, while capabilities are primarily understood as means through which individuals can pursue their own conceptions of the good. In this respect, the approach risks reproducing an important weakness of liberal theories: their reluctance to distinguish systematically between desires that contribute to human flourishing and those that undermine it.
Consider an individual experiencing an irresistible craving for an addictive drug. Should satisfying this desire be regarded as equivalent to satisfying a desire for friendship, affection, nourishment or intellectual development? Our ordinary moral intuitions suggest otherwise. Certain desires seem intrinsically more conducive to a good life than others, regardless of how intensely they are experienced or how autonomously they are endorsed.
The capability approach, like other liberal perspectives, struggles to explain why certain desires should be regarded as more appropriate than others. It lacks a sufficiently developed framework for explaining why, for example, compulsive drug consumption should be considered dysfunctional, while the desire for friendship should be regarded as conducive to flourishing. By contrast, an Aristotelian perspective offers greater clarity on this issue. Desires can be evaluated by examining whether their satisfaction contributes to the fulfilment of characteristic human functions. For example, the desire for friendship is connected to the human capacity for social relationships, while the desire for nourishment supports the biological functions necessary for life. Compulsive drug consumption, by contrast, may undermine several important human functions.
The central issue, therefore, is not simply whether people are free to pursue their preferences, as emphasised by liberal theories, but whether those preferences are directed towards genuinely valuable ends. Any adequate political philosophy should be able to address this fundamental question. Yet the liberal tradition struggles to provide a satisfactory account of how different desires should be evaluated, and the capability approach inherits this difficulty. The Aristotelian tradition, by contrast, offers a more promising framework for addressing the issue by grounding the evaluation of desires in an objective conception of human flourishing.
The tension between promoting capabilities and liberal principles
A second problem with the capability approach concerns the relationship between capabilities and ultimate goals, which, as discussed above, are regarded as matters of personal judgement and therefore arbitrary. Nussbaum assumes that capabilities increase individuals' power to pursue their goals and are therefore instrumental to the fulfilment of their subjective desires. However, this assumption may not always hold. What if a person does not wish to possess certain capabilities? What if, for example, someone does not want to acquire literacy skills? For this person, literacy, which Nussbaum identifies as an important capability, is not instrumental to the fulfilment of her desires; instead, acquiring literacy would run counter to those desires. More broadly, if individuals are free to determine their own goals, they may also legitimately desire not to possess certain capabilities.
This creates a tension between the capability approach and the liberal principles it aspires to uphold. According to a strict interpretation of liberal principles, individuals should be free to pursue their own conceptions of the good, including the choice not to acquire certain capabilities. The state should respect this choice, and pressure to develop unwanted capabilities could therefore be regarded as a violation of liberal principles. Yet the capability approach places considerable emphasis on the state's responsibility to exert pressure on individuals to develop certain capabilities, potentially generating a conflict with its commitment to individual autonomy.
An Aristotelian way to resolve this tension would be to move beyond these strict liberal commitments and argue that acquiring certain capabilities is objectively good, independently of individual desires. From this perspective, the state ought to actively encourage citizens to develop and appropriately exercise certain capabilities, regardless of whether citizens desire to do so. However, this Aristotelian solution requires assuming that human flourishing can be defined objectively, a position that the capability approach is reluctant to embrace. Consequently, the capability approach retains an internal tension between its commitment to liberal principles and its recognition that certain capabilities appear to be valuable in themselves, independently of whether they serve an individual's subjective desires.
Neglecting deliberation about ends
A third limitation of the capability approach concerns its restricted scope for communal deliberation.
Within liberal political philosophy, individuals are generally understood as possessing their own conceptions of the good life. Political institutions must establish fair conditions under which these different conceptions can coexist, without endorsing any particular comprehensive ethical doctrine.
This liberal perspective allows for a particular type of public deliberation, one that concerns means and justice while largely excluding ends. People can meaningfully debate the most efficient means of achieving certain given ends. Likewise, they can meaningfully discuss how to establish fair and effective arrangements that accommodate everyone's individual goals. However, within a strict liberal framework, meaningful deliberation about ends themselves becomes problematic, since these are regarded as fundamentally subjective in nature. Objective criteria for evaluating desires are excluded from public deliberation, and attempts to establish which ends are appropriate are viewed as illegitimate intrusions into the private sphere. At a fundamental level, the capability approach shares this outlook, regarding deliberation about substantive conceptions of the good life as falling outside the appropriate scope of politics.
From an Aristotelian perspective, this liberal conception of public deliberation is fundamentally impoverished, as it neglects its most important dimension: reflection on ends. The Aristotelian tradition assumes that objective criteria can be identified for distinguishing appropriate from inappropriate human ends. It also maintains that people can acquire knowledge about these matters through philosophical enquiry and practical reasoning. Such knowledge, to be sure, may be partial, provisional and context-dependent. Nevertheless, the possibility of acquiring genuine knowledge about appropriate human ends opens the way for communities to engage in meaningful deliberation about them.
From an Aristotelian perspective, neglecting communal deliberation about ends undermines human flourishing in at least three ways. First, it prevents individuals from fully exercising their capacity for practical reasoning, which requires reflection not only on means but also on ends. Second, it hinders the identification of the common good, which is fundamentally concerned with shared ends, thereby making it more difficult to determine which political actions are necessary to realise it. Third, it weakens human relationships, which are essential to flourishing, by discouraging collective reflection and deliberation about shared ends. Such deliberation is not merely a means of reconciling competing individual preferences; it is also a process through which people can develop shared purposes and strengthen their communal bonds.
By embracing a liberal stance on these issues, the capability approach tends to discourage public deliberation about ends, confining deliberation largely to questions concerning the means through which individuals can pursue their own conceptions of the good. From an Aristotelian perspective, this represents a significant limitation, as it neglects key dimensions of human flourishing that depend on communal reflection and deliberation about shared ends.
Conclusion
The capability approach represents an important contribution to contemporary political philosophy, particularly through its rejection of economic reductionism and its emphasis on the multidimensional character of human development. It should therefore be regarded with sympathy.
Nevertheless, it also exhibits serious limitations stemming from its liberal premises. The central liberal idea that human ends are subjective and hence beyond rational deliberation lies at the heart of the capability approach. This idea is problematic in several respects. First, it is counterintuitive, as it treats desires that are difficult to justify as equally legitimate. Second, it generates an internal inconsistency, since liberal principles allow individuals to legitimately desire not to possess certain capabilities, while those same principles are invoked to justify the claim that developing capabilities is always desirable. Third, it stands in tension with key aspects of human flourishing, insofar as it discourages communal deliberation about human ends.
On balance, however, the capability approach has much to offer, particularly as a well-established alternative to the economistic perspective that dominates contemporary political and policy discourse. Reframing the capability approach within a coherent Aristotelian tradition therefore appears especially promising. Perhaps it is worth returning to Nussbaum’s Aristotelian Social Democracy, in which the capability approach was still in its embryonic stage, and pursuing an alternative, more thoroughly Aristotelian path, rather than the Rawlsian liberal path that was ultimately followed.
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